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John Fowles's The Magus can be seen as a paradigm of the relationship between 
art and life and as such implicitly self-critical. It reveals the dilemma of the author 
who lives in the age of Roland Barthes and Alain Robbe-Grillet, as Fowles acknowl-
edges he does, and who, while wanting to represent reality, is profoundly aware 
that literary "realism" is more likely to construct or transform than reveal the world. 
All around us, "things are there," Robbe-Grillet tells us, but these things are mys-
terious and alien and will not give themselves up through words.1 In our efforts 
to humanize them, we do violence to them. Reality, then, may be finally unknowable, 
or alternatively, a fiction—a framework of causality or temporality by which the 
imagination gives shape to the unrelatedness of things. The work of art, according 
to Barthes, is "what man wrests from hazard."2 It is by this definition not a figure 
discerned in the carpet of existence but a structure imposed on chaos. John Fowles 
demonstrates a marked awareness in The Magus of this problematic relation between 
art and reality and does so in a more sophisticated manner than has often been 
noted.3 
Concomitant with these irrevocable developments in critical theory, there have 
emerged two distinct narrative modes, which are inherent in the entire history of 
the novel insofar as we accept Frank Kermode's explanation of that history in terms 
of a tension or "dissidence between inherited forms and our own reality."4 The 
novel as such has traditionally maintained a dialogue with contingent reality to 
which it gives shape and a balance between invention and representation. Now, if 
the self-aware novelist acknowledges that representation can be no more than naive 
invention, he has reached an impasse. He may elect to proceed along either of two 
opposing and radical trajectories, one embracing form at the expense of contingency 
and the other aspiring to a transparent "zero degree of writing," in Barthes's 
terminology, in order to open up on reality. The latter trend derives from the 
belief, to refer again to Barthes, that "the Novel is a Death"—a deterministic order 
which imposes its structures on the world of discrete facts.5 Consequently, the 
novelist who would represent "things" must subvert those forms by which we con-
ceptualize reality: language, literature, and imagination. In subordinating form to 
contingency, novels of this type continually negate their own figurations. At the 
•Alain Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel, trans. Richard Howard (New York: Grove Press, 1965), p. 19 (italics 
in text). 
2Roland Barthes, "L'Activité structuraliste," in Essais Critiques (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1964), p. 217 (my 
translation). 
5
 An important exception is Dwight Eddins, "John Fowles: Existence as Authorship," Contemporary Literature, 
17 (Spring 1976), pp. 204-22. This is an excellent discussion of the tension between art and reality, "eidetic" 
images and the flux of existence, which suggests that Fowles resolves the dilemma in part by "examining 
existence as an exercise in creative artistry," primarily by portraying his characters as the authors of their 
existence. See also Malcolm Bradbury, "The Novelist as Impressario," in Possibilities (London: Oxford Univ. 
Press, 1973), pp. 256-71. 
4Frank Kermode, The Sense of an Ending (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1967), p. 130. 
5Roland Barthes, Le Degré zéro de l'écriture (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1953), p. 32(my translation). 
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other extreme, we find those self-affirming creations which assume the irreality of 
the contingent world and the autonomy of fictional constructs. Such works may 
proclaim themselves co-equal with life, or they may attempt to transcend external 
"reality" by self-generation, supporting Hugh Kenner's observation that modern 
art tends to operate in a closed field as a self-sustaining and internally coherent 
system.6 
These two narrative modes represent radical postures—both ultimately unten-
able. Between these extremes, we are left with the paradox that the form-giving 
(novelistic)activity involves a deception perpetrated at the expense of the real yet 
represents our only means of humanizing or conferring purpose on the material 
world. In The Novelist at the Crossroads, David Lodge describes the self-aware novelist 
as hesitating between two such modes, which he identifies as the fictional and the 
empirical, and building his hesitation into what Lodge terms a "problematic" novel.7 
A second possibility, suggested by Gabriel Josipovici in The World and the Book, is 
for the novelist to make "his art out of the explanation of the relation between . . . his 
book and the world."8 For such a novelist, Josipovici explains, "reality must be seen 
as the fact that we are condemned to see through frames."9 Accordingly, an author 
who maintains an allegiance to both his art and reality may continue to create 
fictions while simultaneously signaling his activity and unweaving his fabrications. 
Or, he may make his text a model of his dilemma. 
John Fowles has exercised the latter option in The Magus. By presenting a 
paradigm not of the world but of the relation between art and life, he traces the 
demarcation between formal constructions and amorphous reality, the margin of 
the creative/interpretive activity as it transforms experience into patterns. The ex-
amination of this boundary allows Fowles to build a creative ambivalence about his 
art into the work and thereby maintain in a new sense the fine balance between 
flux and form that has traditionally characterized the novel. The Magus is at once 
an implicitly self-affirming and self-effacing work. 
The novel begins and ends in the realm of the real—London, 1952. Nicholas 
Urfe (whose name Fowles explains in the preface to the revised Magus stands for 
Earth) relates his own story and begins by describing himself as a well-educated 
young man of the middle classes who has some literary pretensions and who con-
tinues to see himself as a hero in a French existentialist novel. The mature Nicholas 
also explains that he had mistaken metaphor for reality. In London, he starts a 
relationship with Alison Kelly, whom we later learn is cast as reality and the letters 
of whose name, it is pointed out, form "the better part of 'Nicholas.' " Driven by a 
fashionable malaise and a thirst for romance, Nicholas leaves London and Alison 
for a job on the isle of Phraxos in Greece. There he enters a world of illusion, the 
timeless "domaine" of incipient myth, where he is caught up in a masque or godgame 
directed by the magus, Conchis—described by Nicholas as "a novelist sans novel." 
Within the domaine, Nicholas is manipulated by, and helps create, the beguiling 
fictions of Conchis and his beautiful accomplice Lily/Julie. Suddenly the masque 
ends and Nicholas is cast adrift in the quotidian life of London. Here he eventually 
confronts Alison, who has also been drawn into the masque, in relation to whom 
he must finally establish his role. 
«Hugh Kenner, "Art in a Closed Field," Virginia Quarterly Review, 38 (1962), 597-613. 
'David Lodge, The Novelist at the Crossroads (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Press, 1971), pp. 22-23. 
'Gabriel Josipovici, The World and the Book (London: Macmillan, 1971), p. 291. 
'Josipovici, p. 296. 
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While Alison and London represent reality, the domaine of the magus signifies 
the labyrinth of the fictional world within the real one. We may notice that the 
letters of "Conchis" also form a part of "Nicholas." This would indicate that Nicholas 
is cast as reader and nascent author, a kind of Everyman, caught between life and 
the labyrinth—a favorite image of modern fiction. While this suggests that fiction 
and reality have equal part in Nicholas, he does not understand their respective 
roles and takes his life for fiction and art for reality. He has lived, he admits, as 
though he were a character in a novel, but confronted with the masque he tries to 
either possess its figurations or expose the "truth" behind it. Conchis has, however, 
warned him that they are actors and all is artifice. Accordingly, the more Nicholas 
"exposes," the more he immerses himself in fictions. His relation to the masque, 
of course, parallels the reader's own relation to the other magus, Fowles, and his 
novel/god game. We are made acutely aware of this about midway into the book 
when Nicholas tells Alison that he cannot quit the masque because "it's like being 
halfway through a book."10 Nicholas, like the reader, runs through his labyrinth 
looking for the meaning at its center; however, this labyrinth has no center, indi-
cating the unsuitability of aesthetic orders for providing answers to existence. What 
Conchis leads Nicholas to discover through artifice about the limits, as well as the 
uses, of art adds a final irony to a novel that employs fictions to show its own limits. 
It is on the level of this irony that The Magus can be considered self-referential. 
Malcolm Bradbury has pointed out that the dilemma The Magus concludes with— 
"that of how the orders and symbols which transcend life but also reveal and order 
it can really be mingled with it—is the dilemma of the artist himself, and it is in 
this sense that the book is a self-conscious inquiry into its own structure."" I would 
add that a part of that dilemma is the tendency of those orders to falsify life as 
well, precisely because they are orders. Nonetheless, Bradbury has clearly defined 
here the sense in which the book examines its own structure—but only insofar as 
that structure serves as a model for its dilemma. 
Many critical responses to The Magus have, however, ignored the complex and 
paradoxical nature of its inquiry into the situation of aesthetic orders in the world 
by taking the masque for the novel. This tends to place it alongside those self-
referential fictions that examine and finally confirm their own structures at the 
expense of reality. The Magus has been termed a game novel, a trick novel, "a novel 
turned in on itself," and there has even been a question as to whether it had "any 
deeper commitment than a currently fashionable nastiness."12 But it is not essentially 
as narcissistic and self-indulgent as such characterizations would suggest. The novel 
in fact critically considers the way in which such orders as it represents deform or 
contribute to life. While it may appear to turn in on itself through the reflecting 
mirrors of the masque, it does so by metaphorically turning outward as it presents 
'"John Fowles, The Magus: A Revised Version (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1977), p. 273. Subsequent 
parenthetical references are to this edition. 
"Bradbury, p. 270. 
12Ian Watt, in his review of The French Lieutenant's Woman in The New York Times Book Review, 9 November 
1969, p. 1, asked whether there was anything more "than a currently fashionable nastiness . . . behind the 
mind-blowing manipulations of 'The Magus.' " Bernard Bergonzi (The Situation of the Novel [London: 
Macmillan, 1970], pp. 75-76) claims that "Fowles likes tormenting the reader as well as his characters, and 
is constantly setting traps for him" and that "the novel is vitiated by its basic pointlessness, its inability to 
relate to anything except itself as a centripetal imaginative entity." Ronald Binns ("John Fowles: Radical 
Romancer," Critical Quarterly, 15 [Winter 1974], 329) calls The Magus "a novel turned in on itself, crammed 
with Chinese boxes which ironically mirror the broader meaning of the narratives." While Binns is not 
incorrect in thus describing the novel, his terminology fails to clarify its self-referential aspect and risks 
returning us to Bergonzi's point about pointlessness. A good discussion of Fowles's use of play and game 
theory in The Magus which does clearly distinguish between the novel and Conchis's godgame is Roy Mack 
Hill, "Power and Hazard: John Fowles's Theory of Play," Journal of Modem Literature, 8 (1980-81), 211-18. 
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a model of its own relation to the world. Moreover, the use of the masque as a 
metaphor for the novel allows the novel to move beyond itself and to transcend 
the limitations revealed to be inherent in the "domaine." By portraying the world 
of art as a labyrinth, it can at once traverse the maze and stand outside it. It can 
also move Nicholas as symbolic reader from the stylized world of art to a world 
representing reality and suggest by implication a similar course to the actual reader. 
More critics than one have failed to make this crucial distinction between the 
maze and the novel, but let me take as an example Roberta Rubenstein's identifi-
cation of the labyrinth as structural model of The Magus. As Fowles uses the lab-
yrinth, she notes, it has no center. Therefore, to skirt the problem of the missing 
minotaur, Rubenstein has him implementing what she terms a disturbing structural 
shift, abandoning the Theseus theme for that of Orpheus and Eurydice.13 If we 
consider the famous labyrinths of Borges, and in particular that of "The Library 
of Babel," which images the world in an infinite library, we notice that these mazes 
offer neither center nor exit—rather a universe of endless fictional possibilities and 
permutations of the real. On the other hand, The Magus does open up on reality. 
If we therefore take its labyrinth not as the structuring principle of the entire novel 
but as a model for the world of fiction presented within it, we find that the dynamics 
of this shift, in fact, comprise the main issue of the work and the means by which 
it examines its own relation to the world. While Lily/Julie is the Adriadne of the 
fictional maze and as such cannot accompany Nicholas out of the domaine, Alison 
is Eurydice dead through fiction ("this reality lost through imagination," p. 645), 
both because her death has been a fiction and because Nicholas has been seduced 
from her by fictions. The labyrinth consequently belongs to the underworld of art 
upon which Nicholas must turn his back in order to return to life with Ali-
son/Eurydice. And herein the novel again defines its own limits in terms of the 
readers, identifying its domaine as one to be left behind and maintaining a middle 
ground between transparency and ideation. 
Conversely, many readings of The Magus have pursued its meaning through 
the outer framework of the story, apparently taking it to be co-equal with life and 
dealing in messages rather than magic.'4 Like Nicholas in the maze, these readers 
are concerned with what finally it all means. As an example of a common complaint, 
Alan Kennedy, in his "John Fowles's Sense of an Ending," finds there is too much 
technical virtuosity and "flirting with theories of fiction" in The Magus. The tech-
nique, he claims, can only be justified by what he perceives as its concluding point: 
the necessity for a dramatic confrontation between "I" and "Thou." While Kennedy 
notes the book's repudiation of fictions, he feels the rational mind cannot be made 
to square with the idea of pursuing a complicated plot that focuses on its own 
expendability. Such convolutions, he implies, must be redeemed by a final kernel 
of truth.15 In keeping with Richard Poirier's characterization of a modern work as 
one that "includes the interpretations that will be made of it,"16 Fowles anticipates 
such criticism as Kennedy's in the objection Conchis raises to the novel as a genre: 
"Why should I struggle through hundreds of pages of fabrication to reach half a 
lsRoberta Rubenstein, "Myth, Mystery and Irony: John Fowles's The Magus" Contemporary Literature, 16 
(Summer 1975), 333. 
"See, for example, Thomas Churchill, "Waterhouse, Storey, and Fowles: Which Way Out of the Room?," 
Critique, 10 (1968), 72-87. Churchill states: "Beside the Alison story, however, I find Conchis' abuse of 
Nicholas nearly a bore, particularly after a first reading. A better scene than all the freaking around with 
Nicholas' mind and ego . . . is the one mid-book with Alison on Parnassus." 
15Alan Kennedy, The Protean Self (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1974), p. 256. 
16Richard Poirier, The Performing Self: Compositions and Decompositions in the Languages of Contemporary Life 
(New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1971), p. 4. 
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dozen very little truths?" (p. 96). Once again Fowles builds into the novel not only-
its problematic relation to the world, but his ambivalence about his own role in 
such a questionable project. What might have been the message transfers to the 
technique, or in Julie's final words to Nicholas, "it's also how, not why" (p. 487). 
This particular technique, as I have already remarked, can permit the self-aware 
novelist to continue to write without being guilty of existential mauvaise foi. 
It would appear that Fowles's sense of an ending could be better gauged from 
either the inconclusive conclusion of The Magus or the multiple endings of The 
French Lieutenant's Woman, both of which throw the reader back on his own devices. 
The end of Conchis's godgame offers Nicholas a similar warning about the dangers 
of seeking aesthetic solutions to the responsibilities of existence. In fact, the treat-
ment Nicholas receives from his magus (a smile fading into thin air) predicts Fowles's 
own response to the questions from readers, about which he complains in "Notes 
on an Unfinished Novel," wanting to know the hidden meaning of The Magus. 
Moreover, the obsessive pursuit Nicholas engages in upon his return to London of 
the "facts" behind the illusory masque is strangely prophetic not only of the ques-
tions that would be addressed to Fowles about the novel's autobiographical element, 
but also of the sudden influx of young Britons into the island of Spetsai (the 
inspiration for Phraxos), looking for correspondences between the novel and reality, 
or magic. By exposing through Nicholas the foolishness of such searching, the 
author mirrors the impact a work has on the world, ironically predicts a typical 
response to his own book, and judges the peculiar power of imaginative constructs. 
Fowles most clearly exemplifies his equivocal attitude toward the role of art in 
the world in his portrayal of the artist-magician, Conchis, and his domaine. Roberta 
Rubenstein has correctly identified the ambiguity Fowles shows toward Conchis 
and also his "uncertain relation to his fictional world"; however, she considers this 
a main problem with the novel and perhaps a justification for complaints from 
reviewers that it was too much the intellectual puzzle." I would like to point out 
that closer examination might reveal such uncertainty as comprising the only true 
certainty of a novel which sustains its "realism" not at the expense of reality but by 
pointing out the limitations of art. Moreover, as a believer in Sartrean engagement, 
the notion that "at the heart of the aesthetic imperative we discern the moral 
imperative,"18 Fowles is faced with the paradox that while fictions can be used for 
the purpose of instruction, insofar as they seduce us from the world by tempting 
us to substitute their forms for contingent reality (Julie for Alison), they impede 
the very commitment they advocate. Nor does their danger lie solely in their appeal 
as substitutes for life. They have also a capacity for transforming or replacing reality. 
Both alluring and deceptive, such constructions can imprison us, like the self-
generating novel, if we take them for reality. Yet to resist them is to accept the 
chaos toward which the "new novel" tends. Fowles's intermediate stance dictates a 
very tentative relation to his own work—expressed first through his treatment of 
Conchis and later extended to the ending of the novel. 
I made a distinction previously between self-affirming and self-cancelling con-
structions and situated The Magus with those novels that elect both art and life, 
form and content. Fowles does not simply employ artifice so it can mirror itself in 
a fiction that teaches its "reader" the importance of graduating from fictions; he 
also shows through Conchis how art can shape reality in a positive sense. Conchis 
indicates the interdependence of form and content when he tells Nicholas about 
"Rubenstein, p. 339. 
"Jean-Paul Sartre, What Is Literature}, trans. Bernard Frechtman (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 
56-57. 
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the fragment of Latin left to him by his (invented?) benefactor de Deukans: "Utram 
bibis? Aquam an undam} What are you drinking? The water or the wave?" (p. 188). 
Nicholas takes it to be a matter of choice and a question of degree. Conchis insists 
that we all drink both but that it is a question that must always be asked, and then 
with a penetrating look he asks it of Nicholas. It is apparent here that "water" 
represents substance while "wave" is a figure of speech, a way of seeing water, a 
word that projects form onto a protean reality. Much later, Nicholas appears to 
have understood Conchis's meaning when he finds himself thinking of Alison's 
supposed death on an aesthetic rather than moral level and identifies this as a 
"characteristically twentieth-century retreat from content into form, from aqua into 
undo." (p. 402). 
While Nicholas vacillates between water and wave, Conchis, like Fowles, traffics 
in both. Despite his disapproval of aesthetic orders, he deals in them and leads 
Nicholas to a clearer understanding of their possibilities. He exemplifies the im-
portance of such forms in his tales of the burning of de Deukans's chateau and of 
a night in Norway when he observed a "madman" calling to God. He claims both 
events took place at the same time, and their temporal coincidence adds a mysterious 
significance to his story. Yet he states that no connection was possible, ' "or rather, 
I am the connection, I am whatever meaning the coincidence has' " (p. 311). In-
variably, this implies, we discern patterns in the hazard of existence that enable us 
to assimilate it into structures of understanding. Nicholas eventually learns that in 
this case Conchis has been more than a "connection." The de Deukans story, he 
discovers, has probably been pure invention, and although the other has certain 
verifiable elements, its "truths" are ultimately untraceable. Conchis's stories resem-
ble fables in this respect. Like the fabulist, he makes an occasion of storytelling and 
calls attention to it as a "formal" activity. Moreover, a moral imperative underlies 
his stories. Fictions, it is implied, can only instruct as long as they expose their 
framing activity. And of course, Fowles's use of an ambiguous author figure im-
plicitly calls attention to his framing activity. 
Fictions then can be employed with discretion in the service of reality. When 
Nicholas first enters the domaine, some paintings (later recognized as forgeries, 
like the masque itself) reveal to him how art can "set a dense golden halo of light 
round the most trivial of moments, so that the moment, and all such moments, can 
never be completely trivial again" (p. 97). But Conchis does not only disclose the 
possibilities of artful seeing, he also shows the negative aspects of art. For one thing, 
it is not commensurate with the mystery and flux of existence. Here again is Robbe-
Grillet on the elusiveness of "things": "All our literature has not yet succeeded in 
eroding their smallest corner, in flattening their slightest curve."19 We may notice 
an echo in Conchis's description of reality: ". . . all our explanations, all our clas-
sifications and derivations, our aetiologies, suddenly appeared to me like a thin net. 
That great passive monster, reality, was no longer dead, easy to handle. It was full 
of a mysterious vigour, new forms, new possibilities. The net was nothing, reality 
burst through it" (p. 309). But art is not only inadequate to the demands of the 
real, it is subversive as well. So, the eb Conchis weaves, despite his instructional 
intent, lures Nicholas from the world, which will be difficult to recover. 
This exemplifies the dilemma of the author who chooses to cast his truths in 
fiction. For his part, Fowles manages to mitigate the siren qualities and deforming 
powers of his craft by his portrayal of the magus and the dubious morality of his 
charade. At the same time Conchis, in his role as magus, engages in a parallel 
activity with regard to Nicholas: using his fictional creation, Julie, to disintoxicate 
him of the very illusion created to ensnare him. As Bradbury indicates in his essay 
l9Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel, p. 19. 
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on the phenomenon of the novelist-as-impressario in Fowles's novels, "fictions are 
not existence, hence an element of the charlatan exists in the novelist's own role." 
Bradbury has him dealing with this aspect of his role by using "a substitute author-
figure who is both powerful and deceptive."20 Through the magus, who is by def-
inition both wise man and trickster, Fowles considers how the imagination can give 
meaning to the world as well as the perils of such an activity. At the same time he 
presumes to avoid the pitfalls by making them in part his subject. 
When Nicholas returns to England, The Magus presents a model of the con-
frontation between the "domaine" and the "world" which constitutes one of its most 
self-critical aspects. Although Bradbury claims that the novel "returns us to the 
day-to-day world conscious that the mysteries are not simply a theatrical extrava-
ganza but a species of vision about our own needs and desires,"21 Fowles has in-
dicated a much more problematic relation between the two worlds than this univocal 
one. Here he outlines most clearly the dubious commerce between his book and 
the world in the refusal of the domaine of art to acknowledge its boundaries and 
in its tainting of reality with its suspect activities. Art robs life: this is the very 
problem of the novelist who would represent life. Near the end of the "godgame," 
Nicholas notes that the masque has ceased to respect the limits of the domaine, but 
he does not realize by how much until-he discovers that Alison, that crystal of truth 
and reality, has been appropriated by it. So, he returns to London with a small 
sense of the powers of illusion but with a deep fear of never being able to possess 
reality. Life appears as a conspiracy in the service of art; innocent events are imbued 
with a new significance. Nor is he able to trust the simplest human relationships to 
be free of Conchis's manipulations. Alison has lost her familiar transparency and 
inability to deceive, and even Kemp, the most stolid of characters, becomes part of 
the plot. So art infiltrates life, leading the reader to the parallel discovery that Alison 
and Kemp were always part of the plot as he directs his attention in the final pages 
of the book to the admitted manipulations of its author. Here Fowles effects the 
disintoxication of the reader. 
In the move from the "novel" within the novel to a focus on his own framing 
activity, Fowles momentarily intrudes into the book for the first time, both as a 
powerful creator and as a sinister trickster. Nicholas and the reader are waiting for 
the end of the masque and the return of reality. Alison, the author explains, has 
been "lost through imagination," and "to say she returns is a lie" (p. 645). What 
comes next is the acknowledged and partial lie of artifice, for Fowles does have 
Alison return, although he declines to lie further. Like Conchis, he indulges in 
flagrant fabrication, and like Conchis he also refuses to impose a final order, for 
endings in fiction resume and fix the entire structure. Since such orders do not 
freely occur in life, they are tempting substitutes for it. Fowles reveals to the reader 
his need for aesthetic solutions to moral problems and refuses to fill it. In the end, 
that reader may, like Nicholas, prefer lies to silence, resenting "not that he had done 
what he did, but that he had stopped doing it" (p. 553; italics in text). 
This denial of the satisfaction of an ending, as well as the multiple false endings 
of the masque, has the important function of throwing back at the reader the way 
in which he reads—both book and world—for the meanings that the endings of 
aesthetic orders presume to confer on life. To construe in such a fashion is to 
construct; the reader's role becomes homologous to that of the author. The masque 
constantly unmasks this reading activity, this groping after conclusions, which re-
sembles the activity of the author who imposes static forms on the shifting material 
»Bradbury, p. 264. 
21Bradbury, p. 270. 
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of reality. Frank Kermode's study of the ends of fictions and fictions of the end in 
The Sense of an Ending has interesting applications to The Magus. He begins with a 
discussion of Apocalypse. Men, he writes, live in the "middest" and make sense of 
their span by "fictive concords with origins and ends such as give meaning to lives 
and to poems."22 Thus, they create fictions of apocalypse to humanize the duration 
they inhabit. Following the disconfirmation of these predicted ends, new fictions 
are produced; as a result, the fiction survives by its constant adjustment in the 
interest of reality. The relevance of these fictions to literary plots, Kermode main-
tains, is in the falsification of naive expectations about the structure of the future. 
The more a fiction deviates from a given paradigm, the more "realistic" it appears 
and the more we feel "it is finding something out for us."23 In order to remain 
useful to us, according to Kermode, a fiction must not regress into the patterns of 
myth but balance determinism and contingency in "a dissonance that leads to dis-
covery."24 In The Magus this dissonance is in itself instructive, leading to a discovery 
about our expectations of consonance, as they are constantly disappointed. Thus, 
The Magus tells us as much about our relation to fictions and our own participation 
in their designs as about the contingent world upon which its patterns of under-
standing, and our own, impinge. Endings that are constantly falsified or denied 
avoid the determinism that eventually renders literary constructs (like disconfirmed 
apocalypses) inadequate for our needs: "An ending is no more than a point in 
sequence, a snip of the cutting shears" (p. 645). 
What Fowles's ending does tell us, in a roundabout manner, is something more 
about the paradoxical nature of art. Alison's final pose suggests the frozen lovers 
on Keats's Grecian urn who enjoy the dubious happiness of never growing old or 
falling out of love nor of ever possessing the object of desire: "She is silent, she will 
never speak, never forgive, never reach a hand, never leave this frozen present 
tense" (p. 656). By not merely refusing a conclusion but conclusively immobilizing 
the figures of his masque as well, Fowles indicates a Keatsian ambivalence toward 
art, which he, however, declines to redeem in the last lines. Although Keats con-
cludes his ode by stressing that the truths of aesthetic orders are all we know or 
need know, he also expresses an awareness of the ways in which they deny life, 
addressing the urn as a "cold pastoral" and imagining a little town emptied by the 
urn of its real-life inhabitants. Such stealing from life resembles the relation Fowles 
has represented in the invasion of the "world" by the "domaine," an invasion which 
will transfer to his own fictional undertaking. For Fowles, one senses, the beauty 
of such forms, which may be our only way of knowing, is balanced by their rigidity 
and lack of humanity and the way in which they rob reality. In The Magus he has 
attempted to transcend this paradox by embodying it in the novel, thus modeling 
the relation between book and world and opting for the water as well as the wave. 
^Kermode, p. 7. 
»Kermode, p. 18. 
24Kermode, p. 148. 
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